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INTRODUCTION 
Intestacy is an area in which same-sex couples receive little legal protec­
tion of their relationships. For a surviving same-sex spouse, this can result in 
complete disinheritance and defeat the intentions of the couple. 
Intestacy occurs when an individual dies without a valid will. In the ab­
sence of a valid will, certain default rules apply to the distribution of the 
decedent's property.1 Intestacy statutes in most jurisdictions provide that the 
surviving spouse takes all or most of the decedent's estate.2 But intestacy 
laws protect only the rights of lawfully married survivors,3 and in states that 
do not recognize same-sex marriages or civil unions, the estate will be dis­
tributed to distant relatives, or even escheat to the state, rather than benefit 
the surviving partner to the marriage or union.4 
Establishing domicile in the jurisdiction where the same-sex marriage or 
civil union occurred protects surviving same-sex partners because a state's 
recognition of same-sex marriage means that its intestacy laws likely recog­
nize same-sex marriage as well.5 If the decedent later dies in another 
jurisdiction, however, many states will not consider the surviving partner a 
"spouse" for the purposes of intestacy, and as a result, the survivor of the 
same-sex union is disinherited of the wealth that was likely jointly gener-
I. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRor.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 2 (1999) 
(discussing common patterns of intestacy statutes in the United States). 
2. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2- 102( 1) ( 1990). The surviving spouse takes the entire estate 
if no parent or descendant also survives the decedent, or if all of the surviving descendants are also 
the descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving spouse 
who survives the decedent. Uniform Probate Code section 2-102(2)-(4) provides for a flat amount 
plus a percentage of the remaining estate in cases where there are other eligible takers who survive 
the decedent. In most small to moderately sized estates, the spouse's share still consumes the entire 
estate. Professor Waggoner notes that "the grant to the spouse of the entire intestate estate is aligned 
with trends in intestate-succession law throughout the United States and Europe." Lawrence 
Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights under the Revised Uniform Probate 
Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 230-31 ( 199 1). 
3. A narrow exception exists in some states for "putative spouses" who believed in good 
faith that they were parties to a valid marriage. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.2 cmt. e. The Uniform Probate Code does not address the rights of puta­
tive spouses. 
4. "The devolution of interests in movables upon intestacy is detennined by the law that 
would be applied by the courts of the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his 
death." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 260 ( 1969); accord UNIF. PROBATE CODE 
§ 1-301( 1); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 236(1) (The "devolution of 
interests in land upon the death of the owner intestate is determined by the law that would be ap­
plied by the courts of the situs."). The Uniform Probate Code § 2-105 provides that the intestate 
estate passes to the state if there is no taker under the provisions of the Article. UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE§ 2-105. 
5. If a state allows same-sex couples to marry, they become entitled upon marriage to all of 
the attendant benefits, including the right to automatically "inherit the property of a deceased spouse 
who does not leave a will. " Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003); 
see also About.com, Benefits of Gay Civil Unions, http://gaylife.about.com/cs/gaymarriage/a/ 
cdm.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (stating that the benefits to civil unions include benefits under 
the laws of intestate succession). 
June 2006) Free Will to W ill? 1765 
ated.6 Courts in these states cite the public policy exception to the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause of the Constitution as the rationale for refusing to honor 
the marriage for the purposes of intestacy.7 The Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause as containing an ex­
ception to the requirement of recognition for marriages that contravene the 
public policy of the state.8 Because several states have recently provided 
benefits to same-sex couples, this is only the beginning of debate over same­
sex relationships.9 
This Note argues that courts should recognize intestacy rights for same­
sex couples that were validly married or civilly united in a state other than 
the one in which one of the partners died. Courts may validly recognize the 
marriage for intestacy purposes, even while refusing to recognize the mar­
riage as against public policy. Part I details the recent provision of benefits 
in various states to same-sex couples. Part II argues that same-sex couples 
cannot necessarily rely on wills to effectuate their intent to leave their prop­
erty to their spouses. Part III argues that when states refuse to recognize the 
marriages or civil unions of same-sex couples as being against the public 
policy of the state, they erroneously reject same-sex intestacy rights, creat­
ing a gap in the protection afforded to same-sex couples and defeating their 
likely intent. Part IV provides examples from case law permitting states to 
recognize intestacy rights--despite a general refusal to recognize the mar­
riage-for surviving spouses of couples whose marriage violated the state's 
public policy. Part V concludes that courts should limit this recognition of 
intestacy rights to same-sex couples who are validly married, or participated 
in a civil union or commitment ceremony, in order to avoid fraud and un­
necessary litigation. 
6. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also In re Cooper, 592 N.Y. S. 2d 797, 801 
(App. Div. 1993) ("[W]e agree with [the acting surrogate's] conclusion that 'purported [homosex­
ual] marriages do not give rise to any rights' " pursuant to the state's intestacy statute.). 
7. The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con­
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall 
be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. 
8. DOMA provides, "No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, 
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or 
claim arising from such relationship." 28 U.S .C. § 1738C (2006). Opposite-sex marriages from 
other states are nearly always recognized through Full Faith and Credit. "[T]he general rule is that 
the validity of a marriage is governed by the law of the place where it is contracted, or celebrated." 
52 AM. JUR. 2o Marriage § 63 (2005). Same-sex marriages, on the other hand, are often given no 
effect as a result of the public policy exception to Full Faith and Credit. Lynn Wardle notes that 
"forty states .. . have enacted state Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMAs) establishing that same-sex 
marriage will not be recognized in those jurisdictions." Lynn D. Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same­
Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV 365, 370 
(2005). Professor Wardle continues, "(t]here appears to be little room for doubt that Congress in­
tended to allow each state, in appropriate circumstances, to decline to recognize or enforce sister 
state judgments treating same-sex relationships as marriages." Id. at 371. 
9. See infra Part I. 
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I. BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF BENEFITS TO SAME-SEX COUPLES 
The provision of benefits to same-sex couples is incredibly disparate 
across different states. The few states and municipalities that extend rights 
to same-sex couples are in stark contrast to the lack of protections afforded 
at the federal level, where the government has sought to deny the protections 
of opposite-sex marriage to same-sex couples through DOMA.10 This Part 
briefly describes of some of the rights recently gained by same-sex couples 
in the United States. 
In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that restriction of 
marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the Hawaii Constitution's Equal 
Protection Clause. 11 The court remanded to the trial court for a determina­
tion of whether a compelling state interest justified the restriction. 12 The trial 
court in Baehr v. Miike determined that the state did not meet this burden.13 
In response to these judicial rulings that gave same-sex and opposite-sex 
Hawaiian couples some of the benefits of marriage upon registration of their 
relationship, the Hawaii state legislature passed the Reciprocal Beneficiaries 
Act.14 Subsequently, however, Hawaii amended the state constitution to al­
low the legislature to define marriage as a union between a man and a 
15 woman. 
Similar to the court in Hawaii, the Vermont Supreme Court determined 
that denial of marital rights to same-sex couples violated the Vermont State 
Constitution.16 In response to the decision, the legislature created a union 
that parallels marriage for same-sex couples.17 The Civil Union Law gives 
all of the benefits of marriage to same-sex participants.18 
California has had a mixed history with respect to rights for same-sex 
couples. On the one hand, California has created a registry with the Secre­
tary of State through which certain same-sex couples may register their 
partnership for the purpose of receiving benefits similar to those accorded 
by marriage, including death and survivorship benefits. 19 Additionally, on 
February 12, 2004, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom ordered city clerks 
I 0. Theresa Glennon, An American Perspective on the Debate Over the Harmonisation or 
Unification of Family law in Europe, 38 FAM. L.Q. 185 (2004) (book review). 
11. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
12. Id. at 68. 
13. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
14. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-3 to -5 (1994). 
15. HAW. CONST. art. I , § 23. 
16. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
17. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2002). 
18. See id. The couple is not considered married, however. The law creates a separate cate­
gory to define the union of same-sex individuals. 
19. For more information on this interesting concept and some of its limitations-including 
the fact that it is currently limited to same-sex couples with one partner sixty-two years of age or 
older-see the California Secretary of State's Domestic Partner's Registry, http://www.ss.ca.gov/ 
dpregistry/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
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to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.20 The California Su­
preme Court, however, eventually voided all of the marriages performed in 
2004 in San Francisco and elsewhere, leaving in their wake lawsuits chal­
lenging restrictions on same-sex marriage.21 On September 6, 2005, 
California lawmakers became the first in the country that voted to legalize 
same-sex marriage, with the State Assembly narrowly approving a bill that 
defines marriage as between "two persons" instead of between a man and a 
woman.22 In another setback to same-sex couples, though, and consistent 
with his public pronouncements on the subject, Governor Schwarzenegger 
vetoed the bill.23 The ultimate outcome of these movements, and therefore 
the status of same-sex relationships, is likely far from over. As a result, it is 
unclear how a California court would respond to a claim by a surviving 
same-sex partner for intestacy rights. 
Same-sex couples in Massachusetts were given the right to marry24 in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.25 The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court determined that the exclusion of same-sex couples from mar­
riage violates the Massachusetts Constitution, and the court redefined the 
common law meaning of marriage to include "the voluntary union of two 
persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others."26 
New York provides an impressive example of inclusivity for same-sex 
couples through statutory interpretation and policy-making. The New York 
Court of Appeals recognized the rights of a same-sex couple in the landmark 
case of Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co. by defining family to include same­
sex partners.27 The landlord in Braschi sought to evict the same-sex partner 
of a tenant who died in a rent-controlled apartment building.28 The court 
extended the non-eviction protection of New York City's rent-control regula­
tion to the surviving partner by definingfamily to include same-sex partners, 
thereby preventing his eviction.29 Additionally, in 1998, the city extended its 
protection of the rights of same-sex couples by passing its Domestic 
20. NOLO, Same-Sex Marriage: Developments in the Law, http://www.keepmedia.com/ 
(enter a search for "Same-Sex Marriage: Developments in the Law"; then click on "Same-Sex Mar­
riage: Developments in the Law") (last visited Apr. 1 9, 2006). 
21 . Id. 
22. Dean E. Murphy, Same Sex Marriage Wins Vote in California, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, 
at A 14. This is in contrast to Massachusetts, where same-sex marriage was legalized at the behest of 
courts after a determination that it was unconstitutional to restrict marriage to one man and one 
woman. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
23. Associated Press, Same-Sex Marriage Bill Vetoed, Sept. 9, 2005, http:// www.cbsnews. 
com/stories/2005/09/29/politics/main89 I 622. shtml. 
24. They were also given the right to have their relationship called a marriage rather than a 
civil union. 
25. 798 N.E.2d 94 1 (Mass. 2003). 
26. Id. at 969. 
27. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1 989). 
28. Id. at 50-5 1 .  
29. Id. at 53-54. 
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Partnership Law.30 The New York City Council further extended its protec­
tions by automatically recognizing couples as domestic partners if they were 
parties to civil unions or same-sex marriages, or they had registered as do­
mestic partners in other jurisdictions.31 
In addition to recognition of rights at the state level, certain employers 
and municipalities have granted rights and benefits to same-sex couples.32 
Many private employers have extended benefits to same-sex partners of em­
ployees that were previously available only to spouses.33 
With the exception of these limited protections, same-sex couples face 
severe disadvantages compared to the rights afforded heterosexual married 
couples. In particular, parties to a civil union or same-sex marriage are de­
nied an intestate share if they are domiciled in a state that refuses to 
recognize their relationship and applies its intestacy laws to the decedent's 
estate.34 As shown in the next Part, same-sex couples cannot necessarily rely 
on wills to achieve the desired distribution of their estates. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH RELYING ON WILLS TO REFLECT 
ACTUAL DONATIVE INTENT 
Testamentary planning is at best an incomplete substitute for the broader 
legal recognition of intestacy rights for same-sex relationships. Although 
effective testamentary planning would obviate the need for recognition of 
same-sex intestacy rights, it has some possible shortcomings. Relying on 
wills to accurately reflect a decedent's intent is problematic for three rea­
sons: relatives of the decedent may successfully challenge a will leaving 
most or all of the estate to a same-sex partner, a home-drawn will may fail 
for defects in execution,35 or couples in a civil union or same-sex marriage 
may neglect to make wills at all, assuming that their union or marital status 
will protect them in the event one dies. The next three Sections will discuss 
these challenges in turn. 
30. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 240-245 (2005). 
31. Id. at§§ 240(a), 245. 
32. An extensive and detailed list of the U.S. registration locations for domestic partnerships, 
which number nearly eighty-five, is available online. The site also provides the cost, applicable 
procedures, and a list of registration locations in places outside of the United States. Registration for 
Domestic Partnership for the U.S. and Other Countries, http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-reg.html 
(last visited Jan. I 0, 2006). 
33. According to the National Lesbian & Gay Journalists Association, an estimated 4,300 
public and private employers in the U.S. now provide domestic partner benefits to gay and 
lesbian employees. Domestic Partner Benefits Overview, http://www.nlgja.org/pubs/DP/DPovrvw. 
html (last visited Apr. I, 2006). 
34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
35. If a home-drawn will fails to meet the formality requirements for execution of a will, the 
decedent's estate passes by intestacy. 
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A. Challenge of a Validly Executed Will 
Same-sex couples face an additional hurdle compared to opposite-sex 
married couples because their relatives may be able to more easily challenge 
their wills on the grounds of undue influence. If an individual in a same-sex 
marriage or civil union leaves his or her estate to the partner, the will is sub­
ject to contest by the heirs who would otherwise take possession through 
intestate succession.36 If a court were to set aside the will, these "natural" 
heirs would receive the share of the surviving same-sex partner, giving them 
standing to challenge the will as written. 37 
Contestants may challenge a will based on fraud, duress, ·or most likely, 
undue influence.38 While courts seldom find undue influence in gifts left to 
one's spouse, courts are divided on whether this principle is extended to 
unmarried partners-or partners whom the jurisdiction will not recognize. 
Undue influence may serve as a basis for invalidating a will devising prop­
erty to a same-sex partner.39 In Lamborn v. Kirkpatrick, the court invalidated 
for undue influence a will that devised one-half of the estate to the dece­
dent's mistress.40 The court used the couple's illicit cohabitation as a basis 
for finding undue influence.41 Similarly, the court in Will of Kaufmann cited 
undue influence in invalidating the will of a testator who left his entire es­
tate to his domestic partner with whom he had a homosexual relationship.42 
If a court treated partners to a same-sex marriage or civil union as illicitly 
cohabitating, it could be enough to raise the presumption of undue influ­
ence, opening the door for challenge by the intestate heirs.43 
The court in In re Baird's Estate announced the rule as placing the bur­
den of proof on the beneficiary to disprove undue influence if the 
beneficiary and the testator share a "confidential relationship" and the bene­
ficiary assisted in preparation or execution of the will.44 Additionally, 
36. Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners: Defining 
Family Through Tragedy, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 3 1 ,  39 (2002). 
37. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2-1 02 ( 1990). 
38. See Lamborn v. Kirkpatrick, 50 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1 935). 
39. See, e.g., Will of Kaufman, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1 965). 
40. Lamborn, 50 P.2d at 544. 
4 I. Other courts have found that illicit relationships raise the presumption of undue influ­
ence. See, e.g., Glider v. Melinski, 25 N.W.2d 379, 388 (Iowa 1 947) (announcing that influence 
obtained by immoral conduct-specifically in the context of adulterous relationships-raises the 
presumption of undue influence). 
42. Kaufman, 205 N.E.2d at 864. 
43. See Lamborn, 50 P.2d at 544 ("We deem it  proper to attach to illicit cohabitation . . .  [a] 
moral basis for requiring an affirmative showing against the existence of undue influence from one 
who is shown to be guilty of illicit cohabitation . . . .  "); accord Kaufman, 205 N.E.2d at 864. But see 
Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Ct. App. 1990) (not treating a will as "unnatural" merely 
because it named the decedent's partner); Evans v. May, 923 S.W.2d 7 1 2, 7 1 4- 1 5  (Tex. Ct. App. 
1 990) (stating that the "elements of undue influence must exist in order to prevail" on such a claim 
and that a thirty year relationship as a "lifemate" did not constitute undue influence as a matter of 
law, regardless of the type of relationship). 
44. In re Baird's Estate, 168 P. 561 (Cal. 1 9 1 7) .  
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because married couples-presumably same-sex married couples as well­
often prepare their wills jointly, if the court follows the rule of In re Baird's 
Estate, the surviving partner in a same-sex relationship may face a will con­
test based on the "confidential relationship" and assistance in will 
• • 45 preparation or execution. 
Allowing inheritance through intestacy would also reduce the incentive 
to challenge a will leaving the estate to a same-sex partner. If same-sex part­
ners are seen as the "natural objects of the testator's bounty,"46 invalidation 
on the grounds of undue influence would require "strong evidence that the 
will was not the result of the testator's free and independent judgment."47 
B. Home-Drawn Wills and Defects in Execution 
Leading to Invalidity 
Testators may prefer to write their own wills at home for a variety of 
reasons, such as reduced expense, belief that this method is valid and that 
the probate court will follow their testamentary plans, or for privacy con­
cerns. Gay and lesbian couples may favor home-drawn wills because the 
partners are closeted or prefer not to publicly consult with an attorney about 
sensitive relationship matters.48 Although validly-executed home-drawn 
wills generally work perfectly well, testators who fail to comply with re­
quired formalities for the execution of a valid will may have their estates 
pass through intestacy. 
All wills-whether home-drawn or drafted by an attorney-must meet 
certain requirements; failure to comply with a formality is likely to result in 
the invalidation of the will. The required formalities vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, but generally require the will to be 1) in writing, 2) signed by 
the testator, and 3) attested by credible witnesses.49 When attorneys are in-
45. /d. at 56J. 
46. Courts consider spouses of decedents to be "natural objects of the testator's bounty," and 
therefore generally refuse to find undue influence when the spouse is the beneficiary under the 
decedent's will. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 264 (3d ed. 2002). 
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS§ 8.3 cmt. f 
(2003). 
48. Several websites provide specific estate planning information tailored to gay and lesbian 
couples, citing common concerns about privacy, confidentiality, and discomfort consulting lawyers 
about sensitive issues. See, e.g. , http://www.gaywill.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2006); http:// 
www.gaylawnet.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2006); http: //www.le-gal.org/site (last visited Feb. 7, 
2006). Rainbowlaw.com, a website that provides various legal documents, states that "[s]ome gay 
men and lesbians feel intimidated by law and lawyers." http://www.rainbowlaw.com/html/estate­
planning.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). One of the testimonials from the website indicates that not 
knowing "who is 'gay friendly' or not" is a factor in choosing to draft one's will at home. Rainbow­
law.com, http://www.rainbowlaw.com/html/testimonials.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
49. The Uniform Probate Code, section 2-502 requires the will to be in writing, signed by 
the testator or another individual in the testator's conscious presence, and attested by two witnesses, 
each of whom signed "within a reasonable time after . . .  witness[ing] either the signing of the will 
. . . or the testator's acknowledgement of that signature or acknowledgement of the will." UNJF. 
PROBATE CODE§ 2-502(3) (2004). States that do not follow the UPC base their required formalities 
on either the Statute of Frauds of 1 677 or the Wills Act of 1837. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 46, 
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volved in the preparation, occasionally a will fails to meet one of the statu­
tory formalities and is held invalid;50 with home-drawn wills this is even 
more likely to happen. In Estate of McKellar, the court invalidated a home­
drawn will simply because one of the attesting witnesses signed without 
having seen the testatrix write any portion of the will, sign it, or acknowl­
edge her signature.51 The jurisdiction required the witnesses either to witness 
the testatrix's signing of the document or her acknowledgement of her sig­
nature.52 Despite having the requisite number of witnesses, and having met 
the other formalities of execution·, the will failed. Clear evidence that it was 
the intent of the testatrix to create a will and dispose of her property through 
the will could not overcome the failure to precisely meet the formalities. A 
will can also fail to qualify as validly executed if the testator signs some 
place other than at the end of the document,53 the witnesses sign outside of 
the presence of the testator,54 the witnesses receive a gift under the will,55 or 
the witnesses are otherwise not credible or competent.56 If same-sex couples 
choose home-drawn wills, the chance that a mistake in execution will lead 
to intestacy is a matter of serious concern. 
C. Failure to Execute a Will 
Individuals who die intestate fail to execute wills prior to death for a va­
riety of reasons. A survey has shown that "age and wealth are good 
predictors of will-making."57 Some people might choose not to undertake the 
expense of a will if they believe that intestacy closely reflects their preferred 
disposition of their estates. Partners to a same-sex marriage or civil union 
are likely protected by the intestacy statutes where the marriage or union 
occurred58 and so may forget to execute a will upon leaving the jurisdiction, 
at 167-68. The UPC provision is similar to non-UPC state statutes, but it is arguably more forgiving 
of mistakes in execution when read in conjunction with the "harmless error" provisions of section 2-
503. That section allows the proponent of a will to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
the will constitutes the testator's intent, despite a defect in a required formality. UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE§ 2-503. 
50. For examples of attorney error causing failure of proper execution of a will, see Bi-
ankanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 1 6  (Cal. 1 958) and Ward v. Arnold, 328 P.2d 1 64 (Wash. 1 958). 
5 1 .  Estate of McKellar, 380 So. 2d 1 273, 1274-75 (Miss. 1980). 
52. Id. at 1275. 
53. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 46, at 179 (stating that a small minority of courts 
require the signature to appear at the end of the will). 
54. See id. at 1 85-90 (interpreting Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610 (W. Va. 1998), in which 
the witnesses signed while standing out of the line of vision of the testator, invalidating the will). 
55. See id. at 199 (discussing the disqualification of a witness who was a devisee under 
the will). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 33 (discussing an empirical study by Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes 
About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1 978 AM. B. 
FOUND. REs. J. 321, 336-39). Individuals who die at younger ages or who have not amassed much 
wealth are Jess likely to have wills than older, wealthier individuals. Fellows et al., supra, at 336-39. 
58. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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or will assume that other states will recognize their spouse's or partner's 
intestacy rights. Many couples may not realize that their relationship, while 
valid where entered into, fails to protect them at all in the many jurisdictions 
that refuse to recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions. 
Ill. MANY STATES REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE THE MARRIAGES AND 
CIVIL UNIONS OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 
There is widespread state and federal public policy disfavoring same-sex 
marriages and civil unions. These public policies may cause very real prob­
lems for same-sex couples relying on intestacy statutes in a jurisdiction 
other than the one in which the marriage or union occurred. 
Many states have refused to recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions 
entered into in other states. During the Clinton administration, Congress 
enacted DOMA,59 which allowed states to refuse to recognize same-sex mar­
riage or its equivalent notwithstanding the requirements of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause. DOMA interprets the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
contain an exception to the requirement of recognizing and giving effect to 
the "public act[s], record[s], or judicial proceeding[s] of any other State."6() 
Offense to notions of the state's public policy is sufficient to disregard val­
idly entered-into marriages by same-sex individuals.61 
In addition to the federal legislation, the November 2004 elections re­
sulted in eleven state constitutional amendments that prevent same-sex 
marriage.62 These states joined six others that had already passed similar 
amendments.63 Moreover, President Bush vowed to make a federal constitu­
tional amendment banning same-sex marriage a priority of his second 
term.64 
Case law accords with the refusal to recognize same-sex marriage and 
civil unions.65 Burns v. Burns66 was the first reported appellate decision ad-
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1 738C (2006). 
60. Id. 
61. See id. DOMA imposes no limits on bases states can rely upon to disregard same-sex 
marriages. 
62. LAMBDA Daily Headlines, The Advocate, A Year After Ruling, Nation Remains Divided 
Over Gay Marriage, Nov. 1 5, 2004, http://www. advocate.com/news-detail_ektid06950.asp. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, (C.D. Cal. 2005); Wilson v. Ake, 
354 F. Supp. 2d 1 298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 
P.3d 45 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Lane v. Albanese, No. FA044002 1 28S, 2005 WL 8961 29, at *3 
(Conn. Mar 1 8, 2005); Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 1 70 (Conn. App. 2002); Lewis v. Harris, 
875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Hennefeld v. Twp. of Montclair, 22 N.J. Tax 166 (Tax Ct. 
2005); Samuels v. New York State Dep't of Health, No. 98084, 2006 WL 346465, at *6 (N.Y. App. 
Div. Feb. 16, 2006); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1 999). But see Knight v. Superior 
Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding that the enactment of a domestic partnership 
statute was not a legislative creation of same-sex marriage contrary to the state constitutional provi­
sion limiting marriage to one man and one woman). 
66. Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. App. 2002). 
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dressing the interstate recognition of a Vermont same-sex civil union.67 In 
Burns, a heterosexual couple entered into a child custody consent decree 
following their divorce.68 The parties agreed that neither of them would visit 
or reside with the couple's joint children "during any time where such party 
cohabits with or has overnight stays with any adult to which such party is 
not legally married or to whom party is not related within the second de­
gree."69 After the divorce, the former wife entered into a civil union in 
Vermont with her female companion, and the two began living together. 10 
The former husband filed a motion for contempt of the consent decree.71 The 
court found her in violation because she and her partner were not married as 
required by the decree for cohabitation. 72 The court noted that a civil union 
does not bestow the status of a civil marriage in Vermont, 73 and even if it 
did, the state of Georgia only recognizes the marriages of individuals of the 
opposite sex.74 The court refused to recognize the civil union as equivalent to 
marriage for even the limited purpose of fulfilling the requirements of the 
consent decree. In effect, the court required the former wife to choose be­
tween shared custody of her children and living with her life partner. 
Similarly, a refusal to recognize a marriage for the limited purpose of inheri­
tance could cause great hardship to individuals. 
IV. STATES CAN RECOGNIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE OR CIVIL UNIONS FOR 
PURPOSES OF INTESTACY DESPITE REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE THE 
ARRANGEMENT DUE TO OFFENSE TO NOTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 
Given the legislation, recent state constitutional amendments, and case 
law, can states with fervent public policy opposition to these arrangements 
ever recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions for intestacy purposes? 
Different components or "incidents" of marriage can and have been recog­
nized by courts, even when the marriage as a whole conflicts with the state's 
public policy. The reasoning used by courts in the recognition of these "in­
valid" marriages can be extended by analogy to include same-sex marriages 
or civil unions for purposes of intestacy. Section IV.A argues that the pur­
pose of intestacy is to reflect the testator's likely donative intent. Section 
IV.B reasons that a court may recognize the marriage for the limited purpose 
67. Barbara J. Cox, Using an "Incidents of Marriage" Analysis When Considering Interstate 
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 1 3  
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 699, 747 (2004). 
68. Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48. At least one purpose of the consent decree was to prevent the 
children from exposure to numerous sexual partners of their parents by limiting the partners in the 
household to spouses. See Cox, supra note 67, at 750. 
69. 560 S.E.2d at 48. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. (discussing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2002)). 
74. 560 S.E.2d at 49. 
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of avoiding intestacy, while still refusing to recognize the relationship in 
other contexts. Section IV.C contends that courts may balance the state's 
interests in refusing to recognize same-sex unions with the public policy in 
favor of avoiding intestacy. Section IV.D proposes that an additional solu­
tion lies in employing a contract theory to avoid the necessity of recognizing 
a marriage or union at all. 
A. Purposes of Intestacy: Likely Donative Intent 
Not including same-sex marriage or civil union partners in the intes­
tacy scheme undermines the goal of intestacy statutes, which is effecting 
what is statistically likely to be the decedent's donative intent.75 Addition­
ally, financially dependent partners do not receive the protection received 
by heterosexual spouses. The estate may consist of jointly earned wealth, 
and the refusal to recognize the relationship may deprive the surviving 
spouse or partner of a source of support for the couple's children.76 Surviv­
ing same-sex spouses or partners to a civil union similarly lack protection 
from intentional or accidental disinheritance. Protection through intestacy, 
therefore, may achieve important societal goals. Intestate succession func­
tions as a default rule that attempts to approximate the manner in which 
testators would have disposed their estates if they had valid wills.77 There 
are four major policies underlying model probate codes.78 First and fore­
most, they attempt to reflect likely donative intent.79 Secondly, intestacy 
attempts to fairly and equitably distribute property among family mem­
bers. 80 A third objective is to "protect the financially dependent family" of 
the decedent.81 Giving the estate to the surviving spouse probably reflects 
the likely intent of the decedent, in that the surviving spouse probably lost 
a source of income and would use that income to support any minor chil-
75. See Martin L. Fried, The Uniform Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Mat­
ters, 55 ALB. L. REV. 927, 929 (1992) (stating that the Uniform Probate Code is based on 
"prevailing patterns in wills as a guide in determining what the person who fails to execute a will 
would probably want."). There is nothing to indicate that parties to a same-sex marriage or civil 
union would dispose of their estates differently by virtue of being same-sex, rather than opposite­
sex, couples. 
76. The Uniform Probate Code treats adopted children the same as biological children, but 
same-sex couples are denied the right to jointly adopt children in many places. UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 2- 114 (amended 1993). If the children were the biological progeny of the surviving spouse 
or partner, or adopted only by the surviving spouse or partner, intestacy laws would not protect them 
from disinheritance. 
77. See Fried, supra note 75. 
78. Marissa J. Holob, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers From 
Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 492. 
79. Id. at 1500. 
80. Id. 
8 1 .  Cristy G .  Lomenzo, Note: A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provisions for 
Heirs Other than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941 ,  947 (1995) (quoting Fellows et al., 
supra note 57). 
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dren the couple might have. A fourth purpose is to "promote and encour-
h l f 
., ,,B2 age t e nuc ear am1 y. 
Case law supports the idea that "laws concerning intestate succession 
are designed to effect the orderly distribution of property for decedents 
who lacked either the foresight or the diligence to make wills."B3 Spouses 
are favored under the laws of intestate succession because they are statisti­
cally the most likely to be the object of testators' bounty.84 Additionally, 
the law protects surviving spouses from disinheritance.B5 Spouses receive 
legal protections under American law not afforded to other family mem­
bers. 
B. Recognition of "Incidents of Marriage" without Full Recognition 
of Continued Validity of the Marriage 
Intestacy is a unique area in which courts have gone to great lengths to 
recognize relationships-despite their conflict with public policy-in or­
der to benefit the survivor of a "marital" relationship. Ideally, same-sex 
couples would prefer that states recognize as valid in their entirety their 
marriages or unions.B6 Short of that, however, courts can and should recog­
nize the marriage or union when the right to inherit through intestacy is 
the particular "incident" involved.87 The different incidents of marriage 
invoke different public policies, and the right to inherit through intestacy 
is an area in which courts have regularly preferred to resolve doubts in 
favor of the validity of the marriage. In some cases, they have done so de­
spite a general refusal to honor the marriage during the lives of the parties. 
In intestacy proceedings, courts may recognize marriages that are not 
valid in the litigation forum by using the "incidents of marriage" ap­
proach. Three cases illustrate the strides that courts have taken in order to 
recognize a marriage in cases in which personal property would otherwise 
pass by intestacy. These cases involve individuals claiming an intestate 
share of their spouses' estates when the jurisdiction would not have recog­
nized the marriages during the couples' lives. 
In Miller v. Lucks, the court recognized intestacy rights for an interra­
cial marriage, despite a general refusal to recognize interracial marriages.B8 
82. Lomenzo, supra note 8 1 ,  at 947 (quoting Fellows et al., supra note 57, at 324). Although 
the recognition of intestacy rights for same-sex couples does not further this purpose, this goal is  
arguably less important than the earlier-listed purposes. Perhaps the increased acceptance of same­
sex relationships will lead to such relationships being included in the ambit of "nuclear family." 
83. King v. Riffee, 1 72 W. Va. 586, 589 (1 983). 
84. Id. 
85. Id.; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 1 993) (providing for elective share 
of the estate in the event the testator disinherited the surviving spouse). 
86. For same-sex couples, recognition of the marriage or union in its entirety would be ideal, 
as the couples would receive all of the benefits attendant to marriage. 
87. See Cox, supra note 67, at 7 1 8. 
88. Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1 948). 
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In Miller, an African American woman died intestate in the state of 
Mississipr-i, and her surviving husband, a white man, claimed the spouse's 
share of the intestate estate.89 The couple had validly married in Illinois, 
which did not prevent interracial marriage.90 The court stated that Missis­
sippi's anti-miscegenation laws prohibited the recognition of a marriage 
between African Americans and whites and that it served to prevent "per­
sons of Negro and white blood from living together in this state in the 
relationship of husband and wife."91 Notwithstanding a marriage that vio­
lated the state's public policy, the Mississippi court recognized the 
marriage for the limited purpose of allowing the surviving spouse to in­
herit property. The court reasoned as follows: 
[T]o permit one of the parties to such a marriage to inherit property in 
this state from the other does no violence to the purpose of Sections 263 
of our Constitution and 459 of the Code of I 942. What we are requested 
to do is simply to recognize this marriage to the extent only of permitting 
one of the parties thereto to inherit from the other property in Missis­
sippi, and to that extent it must and will be recognized.92 
While the court would never have validated the marriage while the 
couple lived in the state, it granted the benefit of inheritance through intes­
tacy as a single, recognizable incident of marriage. 
The court in In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate93 recognized intestacy 
rights for an unlawful polygynous marriage. A man died intestate in Cali­
fornia, and his two wives living in India sought to share in his estate.94 The 
decedent lawfully entered into the polygynous marriage under the laws of 
the Punjab Province in India.95 The trial court determined that only the first 
wife had a claim to his estate because public policy concerns did not allow 
the court to recognize both marriages as valid.96 The appellate court, 
however, held that the public policy rule only applies "if decedent had 
attempted to cohabit with his two wives in California. Where only the 
question of descent of property is involved, 'public policy' is not af­
fected."97 Similar reasoning is available for application to other types of 
relationships of which the state's public policy disapproves, such as 
same-sex marriage or civil unions. 
89. Id. at 1 4 1 .  
90. Id. 
9 1 .  Id. at 142. 
92. Id. 
93. In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 1 88 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1 948). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 502. 
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The court struggled with the marriage of an uncle and his niece in In re 
May's Estate, but found it sufficient for intestacy purposes.98 The couple 
lived in the state of New York, traveled to Rhode Island for the marriage, 
and returned to New York two weeks later.99 Rhode Island's laws did not 
prohibit nuptials when the "marriage solemnized is between persons of the 
Jewish faith within the degrees of affinity and consanguinity allowed by 
their religion."100 The state of New York viewed such marriages as incestu­
ous and impermissible.101 The court determined that if the couple had sought 
recognition in the state while both individuals were alive and domiciled 
there, the marriage would have been void and without effect.102 The marriage 
was valid where created, however, and the court recognized it insofar as it 
awarded the surviving spouse the intestate share of the estate. 103 
Some courts, however, have not been so generous as to recognize intes­
tacy rights when the marriage violates the state's public policy,104 
"particularly if an attempt has been made by residents of a state to evade the 
law."105 Some courts have determined that these invalid marriages constitute 
a nullity, and they will not recognize the marriage for any purpose, includ­
ing intestacy. In Eggers v. Olson, the court held as follows: 
[P]ersons domiciled in this state cannot evade the inhibition of the law by 
going to another state, and there marrying and then returning to this state 
to reside and have such marriage recognized by the law of this state. Such 
marriage is void, and confers no rights of person or property. 106 
Where there has been no attempt to evade state laws, however, it makes 
little sense to deny rights of inheritance to the survivor of a good-faith same­
sex marriage or civil union. If a couple legally marries in state A, with no 
attempt to evade the laws of state B, and later moves to state B, where one 
partner dies, it should not evoke the same vigorous objection as a deliberate 
attempt to avoid state B's laws. In striking down California's anti­
miscegenation statute, the California Supreme Court in Perez v. Lippold 
stated, "In determining whether the public interest requires the prohibition 
of a marriage between two persons, the state may take into consideration 
matters of legitimate concern to the state."101 Although the deliberate attempt 
to evade state laws is a valid state concern in determining of intestacy rights, 
98. In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1 953). 
99. Id. at 5. 
1 00. Id. 
IOI. Id. at 6. 
102. Id. at 7. 
1 03.  Id. 
104. See In re Shun T. Takahashi's Estate, 129 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1 942); Eggers v. Olson, 23 1 P. 
483 (Okla. 1924). 
105. Perez v. Lippold, 1 98 P.2d 1 7, 38 (Cal. 1 948) (Shenk, J., dissenting). 
1 06. Eggers v. Olson, 23 1 P. 483 (Okla. 1 924). 
107. Perez, 198 P.2d at 21. 
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this does not apply to the case of couples whose marriage or civil union was 
entered into honestly and validly in another jurisdiction. 
The courts in Miller, Dalip Singh Bir 's Estate, and May 's Estate took 
great strides in recognizing marriage and its importance, even in relation­
ships contrary to the state's professed public policy. When the mere 
distribution of a decedent's estate is at stake, it stands to reason that courts, 
consistent with their strong exception to same-sex relationships, could rec­
ognize the marriage incident that provides for intestacy rights of the 
surviving partners to a validly entered-into same-sex marriage, civil union, 
or commitment ceremony. 
C. Weighing Competing Public Policies Allows States to Recognize 
Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Unions despite Intestacy Statutes 
that Fail to Provide for Same-Sex Inheritance 
Many states refuse to recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions based 
on public policy objections to marriage between people of the same sex.108 
There are many competing policies at stake in the recognition of intestacy 
rights, however, and courts may validly base recognition of the marriage on 
the state's intestate succession policies rather than the policies about who 
can marry whom. 
Courts faced with a question that requires recognition of same-sex mar­
riage or civil unions for intestacy purposes can rely upon the policies of the 
state that relate to intestate succession rather than those policies implicated 
by same-sex relationships. Even if public policy does not support same-sex 
marriage or civil unions, the court is not being called upon to recognize or 
sanction the relationship during the lives of the parties. The logical public 
policy to examine is that related to the purposes behind the intestate succes­
sion laws. 
The ideals reflected in the intestate succession policies of a state109 apply 
with equal force to same-sex couples, especially the protection of the finan­
cially dependent family. 110 If the estate of a decedent escheats to the state or 
is distributed to distant relatives, the state might ultimately bear the costs. If 
the decedent leaves behind dependent, non-biological children with no 
means of support, they may have to resort to welfare or other state financial 
assistance as a result. 
A refusal to recognize intestacy rights for same-sex couples is unlikely 
to deter same-sex relationships. Professor David Engdahl, who supports the 
"incidents of marriage" approach,111 points out that when a marriage prohib­
ited by the forum goes undiscovered until after the death of one of the 
partners, punishing the survivor by denying rights is ineffective to affirm the 
1 08.  See supra Part III. 
109. See supra Introduction. 
1 1 0. Lomenzo, supra note 8 1  (quoting Fellows et al., supra note 57). 
1 1 1 .  See supra Part IV.B.; Cox, supra note 67. 
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policy behind the marriage restriction. 1 1 2 Refusing the right of inheritance is 
"[a]t best . . .  a sterile vindication of the policy of the marriage laws, often at 
great human expense to a party . . .  whose marital habits did not conform 
. 1 h 1 "1 13 mce y to t e aw. 
Parties to same-sex marriages and civil unions likely have the reasonable 
expectation that their estate will pass to their partners upon death, particu­
larly if that result follows under the law of the jurisdiction where the 
marriage or union occurred. 1 14 Upon leaving that jurisdiction, couples may 
be surprised to learn, perhaps too late, of the disparate approaches, leading 
to a "stunning lack of uniformity of treatment of surviving same-sex part­
ners." 1 15 The couples' reasonable expectations can and should be honored 
where doing so does not require the state to sanction or encourage the for­
mation of such relationships. 
Although encouraging nuclear families is a purpose behind the intestacy 
laws, 1 16 the balance should tip in favor of the intentions of the decedent. At 
the point where an individual has already made his or her life choices and 
has died leaving a surviving partner, the policy of encouraging nuclear fami­
lies does not apply. Nor would it serve as an example that might encourage 
others to form nuclear families; rather, it merely provides a warning to simi­
larly situated individuals of the importance of having a valid will. 
In short, using the state's public policy concerning marriage and family 
protection allows fulfillment of the couple's reasonable expectations sur­
rounding the disposition of their estate, especially when recognition does no 
violence to the policies behind the prohibition. 1 1 1 Weighing the applicable 
advantages that come out of allowing a surviving same-sex partner to share 
in the estate with the policies against same-sex marriage1 18 allows courts to 
find in favor of this limited, retrospective recognition of same-sex marriage. 
Like the many cases that have recognized an illicit or defective marriage, 1 19 
even a state's fundamental disagreement with recognition during the lives of 
the parties can be overcome. 
D. A Solution in Contract Law 
The law of contracts also supplies courts with a solution to the problem 
of intestate succession rights of parties to a same-sex marriage or civil un­
ion. If a court treats the intestate share as an implied contractual right, it can 
112.  David E. Engdahl, Proposal for a Benign Revolution in Marriage Law and Marriage 
Conflicts Law, 55 IowA L. REV. 56, I 05-106 ( 1 969). 
1 1 3. Cox, supra note 67, at 721-22 (quoting Engdahl, supra note 112, at 106). 
1 14. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
1 15 .  Knauer, supra note 36, at 78. 
1 16. See Lomenzo, supra note 8 1 .  
1 17 .  See supra Part IV. 
1 18 .  Arguably, these policies become moot upon the death of  one partner. 
1 1 9. See supra Section IV.B and accompanying text. 
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lawfully respect the decedent's likely donative intent without recognizing 
the marriage. Case law demonstrates the successful use of contract law to 
avoid the problem of public policy. 
In Marvin v. Marvin, 1 20 the court used contract law to validate a relation­
ship that was otherwise in violation of the state's public policy. The plaintiff 
brought suit against an opposite-sex former cohabitant for breach of con­
tract. 12 1  She claimed she had an oral agreement based on their non-marital 
relationship to share equally their earnings and any property accumulated by 
them. 122 Although the court recognized its role in the promotion of the insti­
tution of marriage, it stated, "perpetuation of judicial rules which result in 
an inequitable distribution of property accumulated during a nonmarital re­
lationship is neither a just nor an effective way of carrying out that policy."123 
The court seemed to recognize that it should not punish the plaintiff for her 
relationship and that an inequitable outcome would not deter this type of 
relationship. Other courts have established that even unmarried, cohabitating . f . 124 parties are ree to enter mto contracts. 
Courts should recognize intestate succession as an implied contractual 
right attendant to same-sex couples' marriage or union contract that is 
wholly valid where entered into. By shifting the focus from the relationship 
the parties had before death to their status as lawfully contracting parties, 
the court is free to dispose of the estate in the same way the decedent likely 
would have chosen had he or she had the opportunity. 125 
v. REQUIREMENT OF CIVIL UNION, COMMITMENT CEREMONY, 
OR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE STATUS 
Even if a court is willing in some situations to apply the intestate suc­
cession laws to benefit the surviving partner to a same-sex relationship, 
what qualifies as an appropriate same-sex relationship might remain unclear. 
Should a court automatically give the intestate estate to a surviving same­
sex partner? How long must the relationship have lasted in order to qualify? 
Should the court have to examine the relationship, its length, and the level of 
commitment? 
In order to treat same-sex marriage or civil union as similar as possible 
to heterosexual marriage, the recognition of intestacy rights should be Jim-
1 20. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 1 06 (Cal. 1976). 
1 2 1 .  Id. 
1 22. Id. 
1 23. Id. at 122. 
124. See, e.g. , Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (Ct. App. 1 988) ("Adults who 
voluntarily l ive together and engage in sexual relations are competent to contract respecting their 
earnings and property rights."). An exception to this general rule prohibits an express contract "ex­
pressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of sexual services." Marvin, 557 P.2d at 
1 1 4. 
1 25.  According to Marissa J. Holob, "[m]ost partners in committed relationships leave the 
majority of their estate to their surviving partner." Ho lob, supra note 78, at 1 5 1 2. 
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ited to those who have actually married, been civilly united, or participated 
in a commitment ceremony that the couple treats as equivalent to marriage. 
Requiring a formal commitment avoids fraud, makes a distinction between 
people who are simply "living together" for a limited duration, and reduces 
the need for inquiry into-and litigation about-the substance of the rela­
tionship. 
In keeping with the majority of states that have abolished common law 
marriage, courts should recognize intestacy rights only for same-sex couples 
that are formally committed. States have sought to delineate rights that favor 
formal commitment over "shacking up" and consequently have abolished 
the traditional protection of unmarried heterosexual couples known as 
common law marriage.126 The reasons center mainly around the fact that 
"informal associations were vulnerable to fraud."127 In the states that still 
recognize common law marriage, the parties must intend that their relation­
ship be a marriage, and couples who are simply living together cannot claim 
the benefits of common law marriage. 128 
Because heterosexual claims of intestacy rights are limited by the aboli­
tion of common law marriage, same-sex relationships should be similarly 
restricted. Same-sex couples living together without formal commitment 
should be subjected to the same standards as heterosexual couples. If a con­
cern of the state is that heterosexual couples would not want their estates to 
go to a partner in a relationship of short duration or informal commitment, 
the same concern applies with equal force to same-sex couples. Intestacy 
was designed to reflect the likely donative intent of married individuals, not 
the intent of roommates or people living together casually. 129 The same-sex 
nature of the relationship by itself should not indicate that the relationship is 
so serious or formal as to be considered a marriage. This distinction is iden­
tical to that faced by couples in a jurisdiction that does not recognize 
common law marriage. Evidence of a formal commitment also avoids the 
possibility of fraud. Therefore, unless the couple is formally committed 
through marriage, civil union, or formal commitment ceremony, courts 
should exclude the surviving same-sex partner from intestate succession. 
1 26. Only a few states recognize common law marriage, and of those, some recognize only 
the marriages that were contracted before a certain date. The states that recognize it are as follows: 
Alabama, Colorado, Georgia (if created before January 1 ,  1 997), Idaho (if created before January 1 ,  
1 996), Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire (for inheritance purposes only), Ohio (if created 
before October 10, 1 99 1 ), Oklahoma (possibly only if created before November 1 ,  1998-
0klahoma's laws and court decisions may conflict over whether common law marriages formed in 
that state after November 1, 1 998 will be recognized), Pennsylvania (if created before September 
2003), Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington, D.C. Alternative to Marriage 
Project Fact Sheet, Common Law Marriage, http://www.unmarried.org/commonlaw.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006). 
1 27 .  Holob, supra note 78, at 1 5 1 6-17  (citing Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common law 
Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1 829, 1 8 5 1  ( 1987)). 
1 28. Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family ? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance 
within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 361 ( 1 988). 
1 29. See supra Section IV.A. 
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Another benefit of including only formally committed same-sex couples 
is that it avoids the need for litigation regarding the substance of the rela­
tionship. The court in In re Estate of Lenherr130 summed it up perfectly by 
stating that in a time of "widespread travel and ease of mobility, it would 
create inordinate confusion and defy the reasonable expectations of citizens 
whose marriage is valid in one state to hold that marriage invalid else­
where."13 1  As long as the couple in question is validly married, civilly united, 
or committed in a way equivalent to marriage, courts should allow the survi­
vor to inherit through intestate succession through his or her partner. This 
leads to a uniform result that does no harm to public policy that might oth­
erwise prevent the couple from legal recognition or receipt of benefits from 
the state during the lives of the parties. It simply distributes the likely mutu­
ally gained wealth in the manner most likely to be what the parties would 
have done if given the opportunity to create a will before death. The state 
need not approve, encourage, or validate the relationship. The bright-line 
standard allows the disposition with minimum litigation, offers no special 
benefits to the survivor, and comports with how the majority of Americans 
would prefer to distribute their estate. 1 32 Requiring a formal commitment is 
consistent with treating the relationship like a marriage, even for such a nar­
row, limited purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Intestacy rights for formally committed, same-sex couples do not offend 
public policy; therefore, courts can recognize such rights, even if they do not 
recognize the relationship during the lives of the partners. People have many 
varied motivations for forming intimate relationships, but it seems unlikely 
that allowing same-sex partners to inherit through intestacy would encour­
age the formation of same-sex relationships. Intestacy merely provides a 
safety net for those who do not execute wills, or whose wills fail for some 
reason. It also reflects the likely intent of the decedent to dispose of the es­
tate in favor of his or her closest equivalent to a spouse. It does not cost the 
state anything, nor does it require the state to allocate scarce resources to 
couples whose relationships contravene public policy. It merely asks the 
court to recognize the right of a partner, at death, to have the benefit of sup­
port from the decedent. In this way, it protects and rewards the emotional 
commitment and financial interdependence between committed partners, 
and preserves the wealth that partners jointly generate. 
Courts recognizing major changes that are contrary to public policy have 
been met with forceful opposition. 133 Recognition of the right to inherit by 
1 30. In re Estate of Lenherr, 3 1 4 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974). 
1 3 1 .  Id. at 258. 
1 32.  See supra Section IV.B. 
1 33 .  The decision i n  Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003), legalizing same-sex marriage, arguably led to the inclusion of eleven proposed amendments 
to state constitutions on the November 2004 ballots that banned gay maniage, all of which passed. 
June 2006] Free Will to Will? 1783 
intestate succession, however, is not likely to create the same backlash as the 
wide-sweeping recognition of the right to marriage. As with the other cases 
in which courts have merely recognized a single incident of marriage, this 
small move of recognition of intestacy rights for same-sex couples is not 
likely to receive the same public or private attention as full recognition of 
same-sex marriage. The only people whose lives it may dramatically affect 
are parties in same-sex relationships who die without a valid will leaving 
their estate to their partner. Allowing intestacy rights will have little or no 
effect on the state, especially compared to the benefit it bestows on the sur­
viving partner. 
Associated Press, Voters pass all 11 bans on gay marriage: Ballot initiatives pave the way for new 
court battles, Nov. 3, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6383353. 
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